The Effect of the Martin Koszta Affair on American Foreign Policy by Howell, Rob
The Effect of the Martin Koszta 
Affair on American Foreign Policy 
by Rob Howell 
Secretary of State William L. Marcy formulated the doctrine of domiciliation 
in 1853 as a response to the Martin Koszta affair. This doctrine helped form 
part of American foreign policy throughout the 191h century, and it continues 
today. A closer look at the Koszta affair shows the source and the need for the 
doctrine, and of course the primary application. 
The Martin Koszta affair occurred in June and July of 1853 in the Turkish 
port city of Smyrna. Koszta was apprehended at the direction of the Austrian 
consul of the city and was placed on board the Austrian brig Hussar in 
preparation to send him back to Austria to be tried. The USS St. Louis, 
captained by Commander Duncan N. Ingraham, arrived in Smyrna the day after 
the abduction and American diplomacy, combined with the threat of force by 
Ingraham, brought about the release of Koszta. 
This was, furthermore, a situation which could quite easily have caused the 
United States and Austria to go to war against each other on the eve of the 
Crimean War, which started less than four months after the Koszta affair. It was 
also an action that Ingraham was fully aware would have severe repercussions. 
In a letter to Secretary of the Navy James Dobbin, Ingraham wrote: "It becomes 
my duty to report to you an affair at this place in which I have taken upon myself 
to compromise the American Flag."1 How and why he chose to go down this 
path is a very interesting and important question, for this action helped to form 
American foreign policy in the latter half of the 1800s. 
The seeds of this incident were sown in the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 in 
two ways. The first was Koszta himself, who was a refugee from the Revolution, 
having served in the Hungarian Army. He was a successful soldier, as seen by 
the fact of having risen from non-commissioned officer to captain, but he was 
not one of the leaders of the Revolution. Nonetheless, the Austrian government 
1 Duncan Nathaniel Ingraham. The Letterbook of the USS St. Louis. Leaf 11-12. 
Ingraham to Secretary of the Navy James Dobbin, 5 July 1853. 
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knew him for his role in the Revolution, and hoped for opportunities to bring all 
of the Hungarian refugees to face Austrian justice. 
The second seed was America, in the way that America and Hungary 
viewed each other. Hungarian leaders prior to the Revolution looked across the 
sea to America and saw much that appealed to them. Several books, including 
noted Hungarian academic Boloni Farkas' Voyage in North America were 
written about America, and "for the progressive Hungarian intelligentsia 
America more and more represented the embodiment of democratic ideals."2 
The Revolution, therefore, was based on the American model. The 
Hungarians sought, among other things, freedom of the press, personal and 
religious freedom, a jury system based on equal representation, and annual 
sessions of parliament elected by universal suffrage. These goals struck a 
chord with America and while the United States was watching with pride and 
hope all of the liberal revolutions of 1848, they were hoping even more for the 
ultimate success of the Hungarians. "How could Americans, seeming to hear 
echoes of the Boston Tea Party, of American independence, of inalienable 
rights, have failed to be moved."3 
Moved America was and, in fact, sought ways to assist the Hungarians. The 
importance of this must be noted, as American foreign policy at this time was 
based upon two overriding principles, isolationism and neutrality. "The cardinal 
principle undergirding the foreign policy of the young republic was 
isolationism."4 "Second only to isolationism as a polestar of American diplomacy 
in the formative years was the principle of neutrality."5 
Yet American interest in Hungary was sufficient for us to step away from 
both principles. President Zachary Taylor sent A. Dudley Mann, a member of 
the U.S. State Department to the scene and even invested him with the power 
to recognize Hungary's independence the moment it was sustainable. ''The 
United States was the only major power whose government seriously 
considered the possibility of recognizing the independence of Hungary at this 
time."6 
2 lmre Lukinich, "American Democracy as Seen by the Hungarians," Journal of 
Central European Affairs 8, no. 3 (October, 1948): 278. 
3 Andor Klay, Daring Diplomacy: The Case of the First American Ultimatum 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1957), 13. 
4 Richard W. Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy (New York, NY: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), 17. 
5 Ibid., 18. 
6 George Barany, "The Opening of the Hungarian Diet in 1843: A Contemporary 
American Account," Journal of Central European Affairs 22, no. 2 (July, 1962), 153 
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Austrian leaders, once this was discovered, were naturally upset at this 
display of American temerity and interference in what was to Austria a strictly 
internal affair. Chevalier Johann von HOisemann, the Austrian minister to the 
United States, made a stern protest to then Secretary of State Daniel Webster. 
This protest specifically covered the unjustified interference of the United States 
in the affairs "in contradiction of the principles of non-intervention professed by 
the United States."7 It lightly touched upon the American internal difficulties 
pertaining to Abolitionism, and also said that if America took an active part in 
the liberal. movements in Europe, it would be subject to potential acts of 
retaliation.8 
Webster struck back, saying, ''that European sovereigns had on occasion 
denied the lawfulness of the origin of the government of the United States did 
not disturb the latter, which covered a rich and fertile region, 'in comparison with 
which the possessions of the House of Habsburg are but as a patch on the 
earth's surface.'"9 He furthermore went on to comment on the possibility of 
retaliation, saying, ''the government and people of the United States are quite 
willing to take their chances and abide their destiny."10 The American populace 
agreed with these sentiments, and "a New York newspaper announced, 'if the 
Austrian minister [HOisemann] does not like our interference in the affairs of 
Hungary, he may go home as soon as he pleases."'11 
Relations with Austria were therefore extremely cold. In fact, from late 1850 
to Webster's death on 24 October 1852 HOisemann and Webster had such 
personal antagonism to each other that all business between the Austrian and 
American governments in Washington, D.C. were handled by their respective 
subordinates. 
The position of the United States with respect to Austria and Hungary, along 
with the Hungarians perceptions of America, made the U.S. a natural place for 
many Hungarian refugees to flee to after the Revolution. In fact, the United 
States sent several U.S. Navy ships to Turkey to convey these refugees back to 
America. Included in this group was Martin Koszta, who came to the United 
States in 1851. He began to make his way in America and, on 31 July 1852, 
7 H. Barrett Learned, "William Learned Marcy," in The American Secretaries of 
States and Their Diplomacy, ed. Samuel Bemis Flagg (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1928) 87. 
8 1bid., 88. 
9 Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York, NY: 
Hen~ Holt and Company, 1942), 311. 
1 Learned "William Learned Marcy," in The American Secretaries of States and 
Their Diplomacy, 90. 
11 Alexander Deconde, A History of American Foreign Policy, Volume 1: Growth to 
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appeared in a New York court and officially signed his first paper declaring his 
intent to become an American citizen. In spring 1853, he and his partners 
decided that Koszta should go to Turkey, taking advantage of Koszta's contacts 
in the Eastern Mediterranean to set up an importing business. 
Immigration was a very touchy subject during the 191h Century. Citizenship 
questions throughout the world caused consistent diplomatic problems, 
although not ones that would break out into war. 12 America had a completely 
different viewpoint about immigration and citizenship than the powers of 
Europe. ''The United States held that citizenship was a status acquired by the 
voluntary choice of the individual, an affiliation assumed or rejected at will. .. All 
European states, by contrast, held to a dynastic view of the relation of subject 
to crown, by which the inherited loyalty and fealty of each person in the realm 
remained indissoluble, unaffected by emigration or change in place of 
residence."13 
This difference in philosophy had two results. One, all of the Hungarian 
refugees were still deemed by Austria as Austrian subjects, and therefore still 
under Austrian law should any of them fall into Austrian hands once more. 
Secondly, it meant that American immigration laws were completely foreign and 
generally misunderstood by European powers. "A so-called first paper, duly 
issued and recorded by a court of justice, was a thing peculiarly American and 
no one abroad knew for certain just how far its meaning and validity might 
extend."14 
That lack of certainty, unfortunately, extended also to the United States, at 
least with regards to the first paper. Each Secretary of State seemed to have 
his own interpretation, which they passed on to their ministers and consuls. 
Secretary of State James Buchanan said in 1848, "a foreigner who has merely 
declared his intention to become an American citizen without having carried 
that intention into effect, is not an American citizen." However, in 1852, 
Secretary of State Edward Everett said that those who possessed first papers 
should be accorded all proper aid American diplomats could give them, 
although "it will be for the European authorities to pay such respect to the 
document as they think proper."15 
The American Immigration Act of 1813 specified that a person must remain 
in the United States for a period of five years before becoming eligible to 
become a citizen. Koszta, therefore, in 1853 fell into that ambiguous category, 
12 Robert W. Tucker and others, ed., Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1990), 31. 
13 Ibid., 31-32. 
14 Klay Daring Diplomacy, 34. 
15 Ibid., 32-35. 
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having signed his first paper in 1852. He, however, felt that his first paper would 
provide sufficient protection in Turkey. 
He had some reason to feel this way. Turkey was the home to refugees 
from across Europe. Koszta had originally come to Turkey when fleeing the end 
of the Revolution in 1849, and he was familiar with Turkish policies to 
foreigners. As long .as the foreigner in question received the protection of any 
Western embassy, they were afforded protection in Turkey due to any citizen of 
that embassy. Proteges, as they were termed, existed by the thousands in 
Turkey. After the incident, American Minister to Turkey George P. Marsh 
remarked: "Austria herself has numerous proteges owing her allegiance neither 
by birth or naturalization, and the practice is too well established here to admit 
of its legality being questioned."16 
Koszta in fact was able to obtain a tezkereh, an internal Turkish pass 
providing protection and privileges due to a visiting foreigner. He received this 
pass with the assistance of John P. Brown, who was the American charge 
d'affaires in Constantinople in the absence of Minister George Marsh, who was 
elsewhere on another mission for most of the Koszta affair. The Turkish 
government, therefore, had no doubts as to the protection of Koszta. He was a 
citizen or a protege of the United States, and either way was accorded due 
protection. 
It is symbolic, however, of the whole affair that despite both the tezkereh 
and Brown's assistance in Constantinople that Edward Offley, the American 
consul in Smyrna and the diplomat at the heart of this affair, had a different 
interpretation of his instructions from Washington. Ingraham comments about 
this: "He [Offley] told me the man was a Hungarian Refugee, who had a 
certificate of Intention to become a Citizen of the U.S. and came here in an 
American Vessel, but he did not consider him under his protection, having, to 
his knowledge, no passport."17 
Koszta in any case was going about his business in Smyrna. He had no 
concerns as to his personal safety, armed as was with his first paper and 
tezkereh. "Its [the first paper] certified copy, augmented by the Turkish passes 
obtained at Smyrna and at Constantinople, accompanied him like a bodyguard 
as he busily traveled around on business for some three months."18 
These bodyguards were, however, to prove insufficient to prevent the 
upcoming crisis. On 22 June 1853 agents of the Austrian consul to Smyrna, 
Peter Ritter Von Weckbecker, kidnapped him. He was rowed out to the Austrian 
16 1bid., 33 
17 Ingraham. The Letterbook of the USS St. Louis. Leaf 10-11. Ingraham to 
Secretary of the Navy James Dobbin, 5 July 1853. 
18 Klay Daring Diplomacy, 35. 
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brig Hussar, which happened to be in Smyrna at the time. The Austrian consul 
planned to take Koszta back to Austria where Koszta would be tried for his 
activities during the Hungarian Revolution in 1848 and most probably executed 
or imprisoned for life. The only thing halting this was the chance arrival in 
Smyrna on the next morning of the USS St. Louis. 
The incident could have ended quickly and easily had the Turkish 
authorities stepped in. The kidnapping, after all, was a direct affront to Turkey. 
Weckbecker blatantly ignored the protection the Turkish government promised 
with the tezkereh and committed the act upon the soil of Turkey, without the 
right or permission to do so. Weckbecker, furthermore, knew he going against 
Turkey's wishes and "acted without authority and despite the refusal of the 
Turkish Governor to authorize the arrest."19 He had in fact gone to Ali Pasha, 
the Governor of Smyrna, asking permission to arrest "a dangerous Austrian 
criminal who had allegedly arrived in town,"20 but the Governor declined, saying 
it was a job for the Turkish police. 
Pasha, however, despite the urgings of Offley and Ingraham, did not choose 
to do anything about the abduction of Koszta when it came to his attention. 
Ingraham notes in one of his letters, "I demanded an audience of the Governor 
and told him I thought this act of the Austrian Consul an outrage upon the Flag 
of Turkey, and wished to know if he would demand Costa [Koszta]. He told me 
he could only report the case to Constantinople; the Consuls had a right of 
taking their subjects. "21 
At this point on the morning of 23 June 1853, Koszta was imprisoned upon 
the Hussar, with other Austrian vessels, a schooner and two mail steamers, in 
Smyrna. Collectively, these ships outgunned the St. Louis, which had just 
arrived. Commander Ingraham was being apprised of the situation with Offley, 
and Governor Pasha was choosing to stay out of the incident. This obviously 
meant that Koszta's hopes rested on Ingraham and Offley. 
Ingraham was a career naval officer, having joined the United States Navy 
at the age of nine. He entered as a midshipman for the War of 1812, and by 
1853 had commanded a brig, participated in the capture of Tampico, and for 
two years was the commander of the Philadelphia Naval Yard. He was very 
respected for his skill at seamanship, and in 1852 was named as the captain of 
the sloop-of-war St. Louis. 22 
19 H Learned "William Learned Marcy," in The American Secretaries of States and 
Their Diplomacy, 270. 
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He was also a very considerate man, concerned with the well being of his 
crew. An incident later in the same cruise illustrates this very well. He placed 
one of his midshipmen under arrest for unspecified crimes. Less than a week 
later, he writes out this order: "As your case must be determined upon by the 
Commander in Chief, and having no wish to deprive you of an opportunity 
(which may not again occur) of visiting Rome, you have leave of absence until 
the gth Oct. for that purpose."23 
He was also sensitive to the plight of Koszta. Ingraham concludes one of his 
letters by saying, "This business has given me much pain and inquietude, but I 
have done what I thought right, and particularly as the Consul was unwilling on 
his part to make any claim being fully persuaded he had no right to do so."24 
Edward was the third member of the Offley family to hold the post of consul 
in Smyrna. His father had held the post for some time, passed it on to his older 
brother David, and it fell to Edward when David died. He was also different from 
many consuls around the world, as it was common practice for businessmen to 
seek the position in order to further their own enterprises. While Offley was 
indeed a merchant, he definitely fulfilled the obligations of his post welL He was 
challenged, in fact, prior to the Koszta affair, by other businessmen in Smyrna 
who desired the post for themselves, but was retained by Marsh who "found no 
reason to be dissatisfied with Offley as consul."25 
The important point to note is that we have two men very capable in their 
respective fields, but who were unsure of how to proceed in this particular 
matter. Their instructions were mixed and uncertain, having received no 
particular directive from current Secretary of State Marcy, and having different 
instructions from previous Secretaries. There were also no references readily 
available to Offley. The first issue of General Instructions to the Consuls and 
Commercial Agents of the United States, a document prepared by the State 
Department, did not come out until 1855: Ingraham says: "I then came to the 
conclusion that I could not claim Costa [Koszta] as an American Citizen, for had 
I done so I should have at once used force to obtain him, and this I would have 
no right to do unless he was clearly an American Citizen."26 In another letter, he 
says: "Should the claim be made, that Costa [Koszta] is an American by 
23 Ingraham. The Letterbook of the USS St. Louis. Leaf 22. Ingraham to Passed 
Midshipman Jason Parker, Jr. 
24 Ibid., Leaf 8-9. Ingraham to American Minister to Turkey George P. Marsh, 28 
June 1853. 
25 Klay Daring Diplomacy, 43. 
26 Ingraham. The Letterbook of the USS St. Louis. Leaf 8-9. Ingraham to American 
Minister to Turkey George P. Marsh, 28 June 1853. 
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adoption, it would have to be enforced; and how can this be done when by the 
Law [Immigration Law of 1813] he has forfeited this claim?"27 
They decided therefore to obtain direction from charge d'affaires Brown. 
Both wrote letters to Brown, explaining their respective viewpoints. Each hoped 
to draw out the situation until a response from Brown could be received. This 
they were able to do, despite several incidents and the maneuvering of the St. 
Louis to a position in the harbor to prevent the smuggling of Koszta onto a mail 
steamer and then taken to Austria. The mail arrived on the 2"d of July. Letters 
from charge Brown to both Offley and Ingraham urged full support of Koszta. 
In a letter to Ingraham, Brown states: "I believe that under the 
circumstances you have a right to persist in demanding him from the Austrian 
Commander. The Porte would wish to leave the matter open between us and 
the Austrians, and if we could see the poor fellow carried off and hung, to let us 
take the ignominy of the transaction on our own shoulders."28 This statement is 
consistent with the statements of other foreign officers when dealing with 
immigration issues. "U.S. statesmen took a stand [on immigration issues] not in 
pursuit of some internal political advantage but out of the conviction that some 
U.S. ideological interest was involved.29 
American ideology was definitely involved. The American feelings towards 
Austria and Hungary almost certainly played a role in this decision making. The 
perception of the United States by other nations and people would have also 
suffered had the United States allowed Austria to determine Koszta's fate. 
Though they exceeded his authority, the State Department therefore upheld 
Brown's actions. In Secretary Marcy's ultimate treatise, he says: " ... compliance 
with such a demand [to release Koszta to Austria] would be considered a 
dishonorable subserviency to a foreign power, and an act meriting the 
reprobation of mankind ... "30 
The immediate result of Brown's letter to Ingraham was the issuance, by 
Ingraham, of an ultimatum to the Austrians. "I have been directed by the 
American Charge at Constantinople to demand the person of Martin Costa 
[Koszta], a Citizen of the United States taken by force from the Turkish soil and 
now confined on board the Brig "Hussar." And if a refusal is given to take him 
by force. An answer to this demand must be returned by 4o'clock P.M."31 An 
important point of this note is Ingraham's reference to Koszta as a Citizen of the 
27 Ibid., Leaf 6-7. Ingraham to Langdon, 24 June 1853. 
28 Klay Daring Diplomacy, 88. 
29 Tucker and others, ed. Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy, 32. 
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United States, knowing this not to be the case, but also knowing that the 
Austrians would not understand the American legal distinctions. Another 
interesting point is Ingraham's willingness to use force, echoing his comments 
in a previous letter, and this willingness succeeded in obtaining the release of 
Koszta at approximately 3:30pm. 
"And now you Gentlemen of the pen must uphold my act. .. "32 Ingraham 
realized that he had perhaps overstepped his bounds, and he also knew that 
the ultimate resolution of the affair had to be determined between the cabinets 
of the two nations. "I know Sir, I have taken a fearful responsibility upon myself 
by this act, but after Mr. Brown had told me Costa [Koszta] had taken the oath 
of allegiance to the U.S. and forsworn all allegiance to Austria, and was an 
American Citizen & had been under the protection of the legation at 
Constantinople, I could not hesitate to believe he was fully entitled to 
protection."33 
Secretary of State William Marcy enters the picture at this point. Chevalier 
HOisemann, on the 291h of August, brought the affair to the official attention of 
Marcy. He demanded the disavowal of the actions of Ingraham and Offley, as 
well as the return of Koszta to Austrian hands. He also demanded reparations 
to satisfy Austrian honor. 
The affair by this time had reached heroic proportions to the American 
people. Ingraham was acclaimed everywhere as a national hero, ultimately 
receiving a gold medal from Congress. Virtually every newspaper reported 
HOisemann's demands, and the nation waited eagerly for Marcy's response. 
Marcy was a New York lawyer, had been the Govemer of New York, and 
served on the New York Supreme Court. He came very close to winning the 
Democratic Party's presidential nomination in 1852, an office he very much 
hoped to achieve. This affair afforded him an excellent opportunity, and "he set 
himself to write a diplomatic paper that should gain the good-will of the 
people."34 From this paper came the doctrine of domiciliation. 
The response was very detailed, and it addressed all of HOisemann's points 
at length. In short, though, it criticized Austria for abducting Koszta and 
supported the actions of Ingraham, Brown, and Offley. The most important point 
was the use of a person's domicile as a determining factor for diplomatic 
protection. "And although he had not yet become a naturalized citizen, he had 
established his domicile in the United States and become thereby clothed with 
the national character." Marcy continued: "Whenever by the operation of the law 
32 1bid., Leaf 11-12. Ingraham to George P. Marsh, 5 July 1853. 
33 Ibid., Leaf 10-11. Ingraham to Secretary of the Navy James Dobbin, 5 July 1853. 
34 James Ford Rhodes. History of the United States From the Compromise of 1850, 
Vol. I (London: MacMillan & Co., 1900), 417. 
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of nations, an individual becomes clothed with our national character, be he 
native-born or naturalized citizen, an exile driven from his early home by 
political oppression, or an emigrant enticed from it by the hopes of a better 
fortune for himself and his posterity, he can claim the protection of this 
government, and it may respond to that claim without being obliged to explain 
its conduct to any foreign power; for it is its duty to make its nationality 
respected by other nations and respectable in every quarter of the globe." 35 
This, therefore, answered to great extent future questions that might arise 
from American diplomats overseas pertaining to an emigrant's citizenship. The 
key point is that a first paper does not ensure American citizenship or 
protection, but the establishment of a permanent domicile in the United States, 
along with a first paper, does require the United States to offer some diplomatic 
protection. Sixteen years later, Assistant Secretary of State John Davis wrote: 
" ... the Secretary [Marsh] rests the right of the government to clothe the 
individual with the attributes of nationality, not upon the declaration of intention 
to become a citizen, but upon the permanent domicile of the foreigner within the 
country."36 
The reaction to Marcy's response was also much more immediate than 
some possible future crisis. "Irrespective of party divisions, the country voiced 
approval of Marcy's skill and discernment in handling a difficult matter.'m The 
affair, not surprisingly, also set back American and Austrian relations for some 
time. It became, furthermore, the topic of legal arguments for many years 
culminating in the 1889 Supreme Court decision supporting the government's 
handling of the case. 
Thus the doctrine became a portion of American diplomatic policy. 
Ultimately, in 1907, the United States passed a law saying, "when any person 
has made a declaration of intention ... as provided by law and has resided in the 
United States for three years, a passport may be issued to him entitling him to 
the protection of the government in any foreign country."38 In the Instructions to 
Diplomatic Officers of the United States, Chapter XII, Part 4 says: "No passport 
shall be granted or issued to, or verified for, any persons other than those 
owing allegiance, whether citizens or not, to the United States.''39 The point to 
35 Ibid., 418. 
36 Klay Daring Diplomacy, 185. 
37 Learned "William Learned Marcy," in The American Secretaries of States and 
Their Diplomacy, 272. 
38 Klay Daring Diplomacy, 194. 
39 A. H. Feller and others, ed. Diplomatic and Consular Laws and Regulations of 
Various Countries (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
1933), 1272. 
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note is the clause stating "whether citizens or not." Both Offley and Ingraham 
had hesitated due to the citizenship question of Koszta, hesitation that most 
likely would not have happened had this regulation been in effect prior to the 
affair. 
Judging by the American people's response to the Martin Koszta affair, 
such a doctrine wa$ also desirable. Though they were not anxious to involve 
themselves in European strife40, from the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 forward, the 
American people were willing to sacrifice for the concept of self-rule.41 This 
meant, by extension, giving all possible support for the emigration of Europeans 
to the United States, providing a place free from the, in their minds, unjust 
authoritative monarchies of Europe. The sonnet on the Statue of Liberty reads: 
" ... Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe 
free ... " Noble sentiments that the American people, a people so close to their 
own immigration, firmly believed in, even though it would be years after the 
Koszta affair before the Statue was built. 
The ultimatum issued by Ingraham was perhaps the first ultimatum issued 
by America to another nation. The affair and Marcy's response to HOisemann 
ignited the nation's spirit. It was, however, the long term affect of the doctrine of 
domicilitation espoused in that response that truly makes the Martin Koszta 
affair an important event in American history. 
40 Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, 310. 
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